

Personal, Social and Humanities Education (PSHE)

Key Learning Area: NSS History (Compulsory Part)

TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHINA:

MODERNIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION

CDI020081438 (8 June-8 July 2009)

Alfred H.Y. Lin (Ph.D.)

Honorary Associate Professor, School of Humanities (History), HKU

Lecture 4

**The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party and the
Establishment of the People's Republic of China (1921-1949)**

**1. Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in
1921**

1.1 Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao at the inception of the May Fourth Movement

- Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀: *New Youth*; the “literary revolution”; “Down with Confucius and Sons Incorporated”; science and democracy
- Li Dazhao 李大釗: Daoism; Social Darwinism

「宇宙無盡，無初無終」

「吾願吾親愛之青年，生于青春死于青春，生于少年死于少年也。……青年循蹈乎此，本其理性，加以努力，進前而勿顧后，背黑暗而向光明，為世界進文明，為人類造幸福，以青春之我，創建青春之家庭，青春之國家，青春之民族，青春之人類，青春之地球，青春之宇宙，資以樂其

無涯之生。」(“Youth”〈青春〉, September 1916)

「無限的『過去』都以『現在』為歸宿，無限的『未來』都以『現在』為淵源。『過去』、『未來』的中間全仗有『現在』以成其連續，以成其永遠，以成其無始無終的大實在。……這就是過去未來皆是現在的道理。這就是『今』最可寶貴的道理。」(“Present”〈今〉, April 1918)

1.2 Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao commenting on the Bolshevik Revolution, 1918-1919

■ Chen Duxiu:

「二十世紀俄羅斯的共和，前途遠大，其影響于人類之幸福與文明，將在十八世紀法蘭西革命之上。」(“Refutation of Kang Youwei’s *Discussion on Republicanism*”〈駁康有為〈共和平議〉〉, March 1918)

「馬克思的社會主義今日已經沒有根據了，所以他的勢力在[德國]國會上也漸減少。」(*Weekly Review*《每周評論》，December 1918)

「中華民國的假招牌雖然掛了八年，卻仍然賣的是中華帝國的藥，中華官國的藥，并且是中華匪國的藥。……我們現在要實行民治主義，是應當拿英美做榜樣。……我們不情願階級斗爭發生，我們渴望純粹資本作用——離開勞力的資本作用——漸漸消失，不至于造成階級斗爭。」(“Basis for the Realization of Democracy”〈實行民治的基礎〉, December 1919)

■ Li Dazhao:

「Bolshevism 這個字，雖為俄人所創造，但是他的精神，可是二十世紀全世界人類人人心中共同覺悟的精神。所以 Bolshevism 的勝利，就是二十世紀世界人類人人心中共同覺悟的新精神的勝利。」(“The Victory of Bolshevism”〈Bolshevism 的勝利〉, November 1918)

「我們主張以人道主義改造人類精神，同時以社會主義改造經濟組織。不改造經濟組織，單求改造人類精神，必致沒有效果。不改造人類精神，單求改造經濟組織，也怕不能成功。我們主張物心兩面的改造，靈肉一致的改造。……平心而論，馬氏的學說，實在是一個時代的產物，在馬氏時代，實在是一個最大的發見。我們現在固然不可拿這一個時代一種

環境造成的學說，去解釋一切歷史，或者就那樣整個拿來，應用于我們生存的社會，也卻不可抹煞他那時候的價值，和那特別的發見。」（“My Views on Marxism”〈我的馬克思主義觀〉，May 1919）

1.3 New messages from Soviet Russia in 1920

- The Karakhan Declaration
- V. I. Lenin's theory of “revolution in colonies and semi-colonies” (i.e., the two-stage revolution: (1) the “bourgeois democratic revolution”; (2) the “proletarian socialist revolution”)

1.4 Chen Duxiu's and Li Dazhao's conversion to Marxism

■ Chen Duxiu:

「若不經過階級戰爭，若不經過勞動階級占領權力階級地位的時代，德莫克拉西必然永遠是資產階級的專有物。……我承認用革命的手段建設勞動階級（即生產階級）的國家，創造那禁止對內對外一切掠奪的政治、法律，為現代社會第一需要。」（“On Politics”〈談政治〉，September 1920）

「民主主義是什麼？乃是資本階級在從前拿他來打倒封建制度的武器，在現在拿他來欺騙世人把持政權的詭計。……資本和勞動兩階級未消滅以前，他兩階級的感情、利害全然不同，從那里去找全民意？」（“The Democratic Party and the Communist Party”〈民主黨與共產黨〉，December 1920）

■ Li Dazhao:

「從前的歷史，專記述王公世爵紀功耀武的事。史家的職分，就在實此輩權勢階級的歡心，好一點的，亦只在誇耀自國的尊榮。……唯物史觀所取的方法，則全不同。他的目的，是為得到全部的真實。……這不是一種供權勢階級愚民的器具，乃是一種社會進化的研究。」（“The Value of Historical Materialism in Modern Historical Science”〈唯物史觀在現代史學上的價值〉，December 1920）

- Did Chen and Li embrace Marxism or Marxism-Leninism?

1.5 The birth of the CCP in July 1921

- Grigory Voitinsky: representative of the Eastern Bureau of the Comintern (Third International)
- The First National Congress of the Communist Party of China (July 1921); the First Congress of Representatives from Communist Parties and National Revolutionary Organizations of the Far Eastern Countries
- The Second National Congress of the CCP (July 1922)

1.6 Two questions to think about in studying the development of the Chinese communist movement

- Did the Chinese communist movement undergo continuous, uninterrupted expansion from 1921 to 1949?
- Was the movement led by Mao Zedong 毛澤東 all along?

2. The First United Front 「第一次國共合作」 (1923-1927)

2.1 Working for KMT-CCP cooperation and Sun Yat-sen's formulation of the policy of "alliance with the Soviets, admission of the communists" 「聯俄容共」 in 1923

- The Comintern's role:
 - H. Maring → Guilin 桂林 (1921)
 - S. A. Dalin → Guangzhou 廣州 (1922)
 - Adolf A. Joffe → Shanghai 上海 (1922)
- Sun Yat-sen's role:
 - Chen Jiongming's 陳炯明 mutiny (June 1922)
 - Sun: "alliance with the Soviets, admission of the communists"
- The Comintern's "January directive" to the CCP (12 January 1923) and Chen Duxiu's reaction to the formula of "intra-party cooperation" 「黨內合作」
 - The "Sun-Joffe Joint Manifesto" (26 January 1923) and the ascendancy of Soviet influence on Chinese politics: Mikhail M. Borodin; General Galen (Vasily Blucher); the Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy 黃埔軍校 (1924); Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石

2.2 The reorganization and split of the KMT in 1924

- The First National Congress of the KMT (January 1924)
Sun Yat-sen as director-general 總理 of the KMT; creation of the Central Political Council 中央政治會議 or Central Political Committee 中央政治委員會 (June 1924); endorsement of the “three great policies” of “alliance with the Soviets, admission of the communists, and assistance to the peasants and workers” 「聯俄、容共、扶助農工」 「三大政策」
- Factionalism within the KMT
KMT Right Wing 國民黨右派: Zhang Ji 張繼, Deng Zeru 鄧澤如, Xie Chi 謝持 of the Central Supervisory Committee 中央監察委員會
KMT Left Wing 國民黨左派: Wang Jingwei 汪精衛, Liao Zhongkai 廖仲愷
- Balance of power between the Left-wingers and Right-wingers in the First Central Executive Committee of the KMT (January 1924): 5 Left-wingers; 3 communists; 16 Right-wingers

2.3 The ascendancy of the Left-wingers after the death of Sun Yat-sen, March 1925-March 1926

- The KMT Left-wingers' and Right-wingers' disputes over the interpretation of Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles
- Struggle for leadership of the National Revolution:
 1. Hu Hanmin 胡漢民 (Right-wing leader)
 2. Wang Jingwei (Left-wing leader)
 3. Liao Zhongkai (an influential Left-winger)
 4. Xu Chongzhi 許崇智 (commander of the Guangdong army)
 5. Chiang Kai-shek (commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy)
- Establishment of the National Government in Guangzhou 廣州國民政府 (1 July 1925) and the ascendancy of the Left-wingers
- The assassination of Liao Zhongkai and its aftermath
The setting up of the “special committee” 「特別委員會」; the exile of Hu Hanmin; the formation of the “Western Hills faction” 「西山派」; the exile of Xu Chongzhi

- The Second National Congress of the KMT (January 1926) and the balance of power between the Left-wingers and Right-wingers in the Second Central Executive Committee of the KMT: 13 Left-wingers; 7 communists; 16 Right-wingers

2.4 The “S.S. Zhongshan Incident” 「中山艦事件」 (20 March 1926) and the rise of Chiang Kai-shek

- Different versions of the “S.S. Zhongshan Incident” or the “*Coup d’etat* of March 20” 「三月二十日之變」: Chiang Kai-shek; the CCP; the KMT Right-wingers; the KMT Left-wingers (see Chen Gongbo 陳公博, *Kuxiao lu* 《苦笑錄》 (*Bitter Smile*) (HK: Centre of Asian Studies, HKU, 1979))
- The aftermath of the Incident
- The failure of Chen Duxiu’s plea for “extra-party cooperation” 「黨外聯盟」

2.5 The Northern Expedition 「北伐」 and the collapse of the First United Front, 1926-1927

- Preparation for the launching of the Northern Expedition
Formation of the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) 「國民革命軍」 with Chiang Kai-shek as commander-in-chief (June 1926):
 1. The 1st Corps (Party army), commanded by He Yingqin 何應欽
 2. The 2nd Corps (Hunan army), commanded by Tan Yankai 譚延闓
 3. The 3rd Corps (Yunnan army), commanded by Zhu Peide 朱培德
 4. The 4th Corps (Guangdong army), commanded by Li Jishen 李濟深
 5. The 5th Corps (Guangdong army), commanded by Li Fulin 李福林
 6. The 6th Corps (Hunan army), commanded by Cheng Qian 程潛
 7. The 7th Corps (Guangxi army), commanded by Li Zongren 李宗仁
 8. The 8th Corps (Hunan army), commanded by Tang Shengzhi 唐生智
- War against Wu Peifu 吳佩孚 in Hunan 湖南 and Hubei 湖北 provinces and the capture of Wuhan 武漢 (July-September 1926)
- War against Sun Chuanfang 孫傳芳 in Jiangsu 江蘇, Anhui 安徽, Jiangxi 江

西, Zhejiang 浙江 and Fujian 福建 provinces and the capture of Nanchang 南昌 (September-November 1926)

- Split between Wuhan (KMT Left-wingers) and Nanchang (Chiang Kai-shek) (December 1926-March 1927)

- Chiang Kai-shek's capture of Shanghai 上海 and the launching of the "party purification" campaign 「清黨」運動 (March-April 1927)

Joseph Stalin *versus* Leon Trotsky and its effect on the Northern Expedition

The CCP-led General Labour Union 總工會 *versus* the KMT-led National Labour Union 工商業聯合會 and the start of "party purification"

- The establishment of the Nationalist Government in Nanjing 南京國民政府 (18 April 1927) and the "split between Nanjing and Wuhan" 「寧漢分裂」

The predicament of the KMT Left-wingers in Wuhan: economic collapse and mutiny of the army in Changsha 長沙

The predicament of the communists in Wuhan: Stalin's directive to the CCP (1 June) and the Comintern's accusation of Chen Duxiu's "right capitulationism" 「右傾投降主義」

- The KMT Left-wingers' "split with the communists" 「分共」 (15 July 1927) and "*rapprochement* between Nanjing and Wuhan" 「寧漢復合」

M. N. Roy's disclosure of Stalin's 1 June telegram to Wang Jingwei and Wuhan's "split with the communists"

The Eastern Expedition 「東征」 against Chiang Kai-shek; the CCP-led Nanchang Uprising 南昌起義 (1 August) and the total collapse of the First United Front

Mediation by the KMT Right-wingers and "*rapprochement* between Nanjing and Wuhan"

3. KMT-CCP struggles (1927-1937)

3.1 Two lines of revolution: the Chinese communist movement after the collapse of the First United Front

- Urban, workers' revolution (the Comintern)
- Rural, peasant revolution (Mao Zedong)

3.2 The staging of urban, workers' insurrections under the guidance of the Comintern

- Qu Qiubai 瞿秋白 and Li Lisan 李立三 as scapegoats of the Comintern's erroneous China policy.

3.2.1 The period under the leadership of Qu Qiubai, August 1927-spring of 1928

- Stalin's and Trotsky's views on the Chinese situation after the failure of the "Great Revolution" 「大革命」 of 1924-1927
- Qu Qiubai's arduous task: looking out for rising "revolutionary waves" 「革命浪潮」 as instructed by Stalin
The Autumn Harvest Uprising 「湖南秋收起義」 (September 1927): Mao Zedong
The Guangzhou Uprising 「廣州起義」 (December 1927): Peng Pai 澎湃 and the Hailufeng soviet 「海陸豐蘇維埃」
- The Comintern's accusation of Qu Qiubai's "left' putschism" 「『左』傾冒險主義」
- Nikolai Bukharin's formula of two "revolutionary waves" divided by a momentary "trough"

3.2.2 The period under the leadership of Li Lisan, summer of 1928-winter of 1930

- Li Lisan's arduous task: looking out for rising "revolutionary waves" as instructed by Stalin
The Comintern's instruction (October 1929) and the Changsha Uprising 「長沙起義」 (July 1930)
Factionalism within the CCP: Li Lisan *versus* the "Comintern faction" 「國際派」/ the "returned student clique" 「留學生幫」/ the "28 Bolsheviks" 「二十八個布爾什維克」 (Wang Ming 王明 (Chen Shaoyu 陳紹禹), Bo Gu 博古 (Qin Bangxian 秦邦憲), Zhang Wentian 張聞天)
- Pavel Mif's explanation of the theory of "revolutionary waves": the distinction between a "revolutionary wave (*pod'em*)" and a "direct revolutionary situation"

3.2.3 The period under the leadership of the “Comintern faction”, 1931-1934

- Abandonment of the Shanghai base and retreat to Ruijin 瑞金 (early 1933)

3.3 The staging of rural, peasant revolution under the leadership of Mao Zedong

3.3.1 From the setting up of the Jinggangshan 井岡山 revolutionary base to the birth of the Chinese Soviet Republic 中華蘇維埃共和國 in Jiangxi province, November 1927-November 1931

- The formation of the Fourth Red Army 紅四軍 in the Jinggang Mountains (June 1928): Mao Zedong, Zhu De 朱德, Chen Yi 陳毅
- The establishment of the Jiangxi soviet (January 1929): the “real power faction” 「實力(權)派」
- Mao Zedong’s theory of revolution:
 1. “Seizure of power by armed force” 「武裝奪取政權」
 2. “Encircling the cities from the countryside” 「農村包圍城市」
 3. Establishment of a revolutionary party and a people’s army
 4. “The party commands the gun” 「黨指揮槍」: the Gutian meeting 古田會議 (December 1929)
 5. Rejection of “dogmatism” 「教條主義」: “Without conducting surveys, one does not have the right to speak” 「沒有調查，沒有發言權」; writing of “Oppose Book Worship” 〈反對本本主義〉 (May 1930)
 6. Maximization of mass support: “rely on poor peasants, unite with middle peasants, restrict the rich peasants, protect medium and small businessmen, and eliminate the landlord class” 「依靠貧農，聯合中農，限制富農，保護中小工商業者，消滅地主階級」
- Chiang Kai-shek’s 1st, 2nd, 3rd “Encirclement and Suppression” 「圍剿」 Campaigns against the communists (December 1930- July 1931)
Mao’s counter-“encirclement and suppression” 反「圍剿」 strategy and tactics: “lure the enemy deep into soviet territories” 「誘敵深入」; “concentrate forces to hit at the weak spot of enemy column” 「集中兵力，

先打弱敵」; “avoid main enemy force”; and “when the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy is stationed, we harass; when the enemy is tired, we attack; when the enemy retreats, we pursue” 「避敵主力」、「敵進我退；敵駐我擾；敵疲我打；敵退我進」

The First National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic (November 1931): “Outline of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic” 《中華蘇維埃共和國憲法大綱》; “Labour Law” 《勞動法》; “Land Law” 《土地法》

3.3.2 The predicament and eventual collapse of the Chinese Soviet Republic, November 1931-October 1934

- Criticism of Mao’s “rich peasant line” 「富農路線」 and “guerrilla-ism” 「游擊主義」 by the “Comintern faction”; dispute over the “Circular of Declaring War on Japan” 《對日宣戰通電》 (April 1932)
- Chiang Kai-shek’s 4th “Encirclement and Suppression” Campaign against the communists (June 1932-March 1933)
The Ningdu Conference 寧都會議 (October 1932) and Mao’s fall from power: the role played by Zhou Enlai 周恩來
- The arrival of the CCP Central Committee in Ruijin and intensification of intra-party strife: the “land classification campaign” 「查田運動」 (June 1933)
- Chiang Kai-shek’s 5th “Encirclement and Suppression” Campaign against the communists (September 1933) and the collapse of the Chinese Soviet Republic (October 1934)
Chiang’s strategy of “fortification and blockade” 「步步為營，堡壘推進」
Li De 李德 (Otto Braun): “regularization” of the Red Army; “taking the offensive” 「全線出擊」; “engaging the enemy outside the gates of our own territories” 「禦敵於國門之外」; refusal to help the People’s Revolutionary Government of the Chinese Republic 「中華共和國人民革命政府」 (Cai Tingkai 蔡廷鍇 and Jiang Guangnai 蔣光鼐)
- The Red Army’s Long March 「長征」 (October 1934-October 1935): the

Zunyi Conference 遵義會議 (January 1935); Yan'an 延安 (Shaanxi 陝西 province)

- The Xian Incident 「西安事變」 (December 1936): Zhang Xueliang 張學良; Yang Hucheng 楊虎成

4. The Second United Front 「第二次國共合作」 (1937-1945)

4.1 The plight of the Nationalist Government in the eight-year War of Resistance against Japan 「抗日戰爭」

4.1.1 Chiang Kai-shek's strategy of resistance against Japan: fighting a “protracted war” 「持久戰」 and a “war of attrition” 「消耗戰」

- Two phases of the War of Resistance against Japan:
 1. “Trading space for time” 「以空間換取時間」 (July 1937-December 1938): retreat of the Nationalist Government to Wuhan 武漢 and further inland to Chongqing 重慶
 2. Stalemate and final defeat of Japan (1939-August 1945):
Breakdown of the Second United Front: the “New Fourth Army Incident” 「新四軍事件」 / “Southern Anhui Incident” 「皖南事變」 (January 1941)
Japanese occupation of the “points” 「點」 and “lines” 「線」; launching of “mopping up” operations 「掃蕩戰」 against CCP resistance bases in the “areas” 「面」 behind enemy lines; launching of Operation Ichigo 「一號作戰」 (the Battle of Henan-Hunan-Guangxi 「豫湘桂戰役」) against Nationalist forces (May-December 1944)

4.1.2 The dilemma that KMT territories faced and the countermeasures adopted by the Nationalist Government in Chongqing

- Shortage of food-grain: prohibition of the planting of poppy; encouragement of the cultivation of grain; designation of the land tax in KMT territories as a national tax; collection of the land tax in kind; implementation of food rationing

- Financial insolvency: issuance of banknotes
- Difficulty of fighting a “protracted war” on the basis of a traditional, agricultural economy: promotion of industry

4.1.3 The effects of the Sino-Japanese War on the Nationalist Government

- Weakening the military strength of the Nationalist Government
- Weakening of the morale of Nationalist officials: the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps 「三民主義青年團」; the “renovationist movement” 「革新運動」
- Aggravating the discontent of the peasants
- Unleashing galloping inflation
- Facilitating the expansion of communist power

4.2 The development of the Chinese communist movement in the eight-year War of Resistance against Japan

4.2.1 The ups and downs of the CCP during the War of Resistance against Japan

- Three phases of development:
 1. Mushrooming of anti-Japanese resistance bases and rapid growth of the Chinese communist movement (July 1937-December 1938): “consolidated zones”/ “semi-consolidated zones”/ “guerrilla zones” in a resistance base; central resistance base (the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region 陝甘寧邊區)
 2. Drastic contraction of anti-Japanese resistance bases (1939-1943): Japanese “mopping up” operations and “three-all” policy 「三光政策」 (“kill all, burn all, loot all” 「殺光、燒光、搶光」) in North China; the CCP’s Hundred Regiments Offensive 「百團大戰」 (August 1940) and Japanese reprisals
Blockade of resistance bases by Nationalist troops and the “New Fourth Army Incident” (January 1941)
“Campaigns”/ “movements” launched by the CCP in 1942-1943:
 - (1) Organizational sphere: the “rectification campaign” 「整風運動」 against “subjectivism” 「主觀主義」 (i.e., “dogmatism” 「教條主

- 義」and “empiricism”「經驗主義」), “sectarianism”「宗派主義」, and “stereotyped party writing”「黨八股」; the “investigation of cadres campaign”「審查幹部運動」; the “campaign for crack troops and simple administration”「精兵簡政」
- (2) Political sphere: the “three-thirds system”「三三制」(communists, non-party leftist progressives, and middle-of-the-roaders)
 - (3) Ideological and educational spheres: the “to-the-village campaign”「下鄉運動」; the “popular education movement”「時事教育」
 - (4) Economic sphere: the “production movement”「大生產運動」, the “campaign for the reduction of rent and interest”「減租減息運動」; the “mutual aid and cooperative movement”「互助合作運動」
3. Re-expansion of anti-Japanese resistance bases (1944-August 1945): Operation Ichigo (May-December 1944) and communist re-expansion

4.2.2 Explaining the CCP's rise to power during the Sino-Japanese War: an assessment of three representative views in Western historiography

- Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962)
- Mark Selden, *The Yanan Way in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971)
- Ralph Thaxton's *China Turned Rightside Up: Revolutionary Legitimacy in the Peasant World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983)

4.3 Effects of the Sino-Japanese War on China's modernization

5. The Civil War 「國共內戰」 (1946-1949) and the establishment of the People's Republic of China

- Factors conducive to modernization after the defeat of Japan
- The Chongqing negotiations 重慶和談 (August-December 1945) and the Marshall Mission (December 1945-March 1946)
- Drift toward civil war (March-June 1946)

5.1 The Civil War, July 1946-1949

5.1.1 The defeat of the Nationalist army

- Two phases of the Civil War:
 1. The Nationalist army's all-out offensive and the general retreat of the communists (July 1946-June 1947)
 2. The communists' full-scale counter-offensive and Nationalist defeat (July 1947-October 1949): (1) The Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign 遼瀋戰役 (September-November 1948); (2) the Huai-Hai Campaign 淮海戰役 (November 1948-January 1949); (3) the Beiping-Tianjian Campaign 平津戰役(December 1948-January 1949)

5.1.2 The collapse of the Nationalist Government

- Runaway inflation:

<u>Year/month</u>	<u>Fabi: U.S. dollars</u>	<u>Price Index (1937=100)</u>
1940	20 : 1	
1945/Dec	3,500 : 1	160,000
1946/Dec	6,500 : 1	600,000
1947/Dec	75,000 : 1	10,000,000
1948/May	2,000,000 : 1	
1948/June	4,000,000 : 1	
1948/July	8,000,000 : 1	
1948/Aug	11,000,000 : 1	280,000,000

Replacement of the old *fabi* by the Gold Yuan 金圓券 (August 1948) at the rate of 3,000,000:1

- Rampant corruption of Nationalist officials: rise of the “bureaucratic capitalists” 「官僚資產階級」
- Dissatisfaction of the “national bourgeoisie” 「民族資產階級」: the signing of the “Sino-U.S. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation” 《中美友好航海通商條約》 (November 1946)

- Alienation of the intellectuals and students

5.2 Who lost China?

- Chiang Kai-shek: “the man who lost China”

5.2.1 Chiang Kai-shek's own testimony

- 「無論就哪一方面看，我們都佔有絕對的優勢：軍隊的裝備，作戰技術或經驗，共軍不如我們，至於軍需補給，如糧食彈藥等，我們也比匪軍豐富十倍。」 (June 1947)
- 「物質上我們有很好的裝備，有很精良的武器，可以說具備了一切勝利的條件。……但是，我們勦匪為什麼還要遭受挫折，遭受損失呢？」 (January 1948)

Chiang Kai-shek's criticisms of his military subordinates:

1. 缺乏軍事學識和專業技能（「打糊塗仗」）
2. 對屬下士兵不聞不問，還侵吞軍餉（「士兵不叛變，不逃跑已算很好」）
3. 「精神疏懈，道德低落」
4. 不能彼此合作（「大家都養成了自保自足的惡習，只看到自己的一部的利益，對於友軍的危難，整個戰爭的成敗，幾乎是漠不相關」）
5. 邀功爭寵，推卸責任（「如果我們打了敗仗，就彼此怨恨，互相攻訐，將自己的過失，盡量掩護，將打敗的責任，推得乾乾淨淨。」
「勝利卻爭功爭賞。」）
6. 虛報及不聽命令

Chiang Kai-shek's criticisms of the KMT and the Three People's Principles Youth Corps:

「老實說，在古今中外任何革命黨都沒有像我們今天這樣頹唐腐敗；也沒有像我們今天這樣的沒有精神，沒有紀律，更沒有是非標準，這樣的黨早就應該被消滅被淘汰了。」

「我們黨和團沒有基層組織，沒有新生的細胞，黨員和團員在群眾間發生不了作用，整個黨的生存，差不多完全寄托在有形的武力上，這是我們真正的危機，也是我唯一的憂愁。」

- 「軍事和政府部門對過去的失敗都負有責任。但是最主要的責任，這一點不能否認，是因為黨的癱瘓，黨員、黨的組織機構和黨的領導方式問題重重。因此，黨成了行屍走肉，政府和軍隊也就喪魂失魄，結果是軍隊崩敗，社會動亂。」

「今天，我痛心地指出，從抗戰後期到現在，我們革命軍隊中表現出的貪污腐敗，真是無奇不有，簡直難以想像。……這樣的軍隊就不能不走向失敗。」 (January 1949)

5.2.2 Could Chiang Kai-shek rid himself of all responsibilities?

5.2.3 Why didn't Chiang Kai-shek dismiss negligent and corrupt subordinates?

- Madame Chiang Kai-shek to General C. L. Chennault (commander of the “Flying Tigers”): “He [Chiang Kai-shek] said these are the only people he can work with. If we sack them, who will there be left to work for us?”

5.3 Conclusion

- “What we have been observing since V-J [Victory over Japan] Day, and especially during the latter half of last year, is in a sense the decay of the ancient Chinese system of Government....In the case of Chiang Kai-shek himself there is no need to question his personal probity nor his patriotic motives, but his concepts and methods were undemocratic. There were also many in the Government of high integrity and liberal views. But the system permitted and even fostered the evils which caused its downfall. It had become so corrupt and inefficient, and had so completely lost all popular support, that there was but little hope of orderly reforms arising from within, and revolutionary outbreaks might have been expected even had there been no Communist Movement.” (John Leighton Stuart (U.S. ambassador to China), report to the U.S. Secretary of State dated 5 February 1949)
- 「人必自侮而後人侮之
家必自毀而後人毀之
國必自伐而後人伐之」
《孟子》