The Great Recession: European Sovereign Debt Crisis

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Overview

- Background
- Origins of the crisis
  - Greece
  - Spain
  - Why the crisis seems never end?
- Policy responses
  - What have been done?
  - Recent proposals
The European Union

- Though with a significant economic dimension, …
  - On the road to the EU
    - Treaty of Paris (1951)
      - European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
    - Treaty of Rome (1957)
      - European Economic Community (EEC)
    - Maastricht Treaty (1992)
      - The treaty created the European Union (EU) and the euro (€).
… the European Union is a political project.

“The European Union is set up with the aim of ending the frequent and bloody wars between neighbours, which culminated in the Second World War, […] to unite European countries economically and politically in order to secure lasting peace.”

The Euro

- EU
  ≠ Euro area

The Euro

- 27 EU member states
- 17 euro area member states
  - Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain
The Euro

- Reasons / advantages for a single currency
  - Complement to the single market to improve efficiency
  - Eliminate currency exchange costs and facilitate international trade

The Euro

- Reasons / advantages for a single currency
  - Protect the euro area from external economic shocks given the size and strength of the euro area

The Euro

- Reasons / advantages for a single currency
  - Create a mechanism for a low inflation and low interest rates and encourage sound public finances

Reasons / advantages for a single currency
- Give the EU a more powerful voice in the world
- Give a tangible symbol of their European identity

The Euro

- Shortcomings
  - One monetary policy for economies with dissimilar structures
  - National governments lost the monetary instruments
The Euro

Convergence Criteria in the EU Treaty (Details in Appendix)

- Economic convergence
  - The ratio of government deficit to GDP must not exceed 3%
  - The ratio of government debt to GDP must not exceed 60%

The Case of Greece
Sovereign Debt Crisis

- Sovereign Debt
  - Debt of the government
  - Debt (stock) vs. Deficit (flow)
  - Deficit = Revenue – Expenditure
  - Debt = cumulative sum of deficits

Sovereign Debt Crisis

- Crisis
  - Alerting signal
  - Rising doubt on the ability to repay
  - Increased risk of default
  - Confidence crisis

- Shredding market confidence
  - Decrease in demand for bond
  - Bond price decreases
  - Yield increase to cover the risk

- Debt perceived to be even more unsustainable

Trigger

1. High debt level

2. Bad signal from the Greek government
   - On 23 April 2010, the prime minister formally requested about $53 billion in financial aid from the EU and the IMF to repay its maturing debt obligations.

Source: Smith, Aaron (23 Apr 2010) Greek debt fears ease after EU aid request. CNN Money.
Prospects - Overview

- Structural deficit $\rightarrow$ swelling debt
  - Expenditures (Long term burden)
    - Wage burden
    - Public investment
    - Pension
  - Revenue
    - Shadow economy (tax evasion)
- Economic health $\rightarrow$ generate income to repay
  - Economic structure
  - Labor market
Prospects – Structural Deficits

- Wage burden of the Greek government
  - Many people work in the public sector
  - Relatively high wage in the public sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Employee Share (%)</th>
<th>Wage Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prospects – Structural Deficits

- Relatively high public investment
  - For example, the 2004 Athens Olympics
    - €3 bn on construction of sporting facilities
    - €4.2 bn on transportation
    - €1.2 bn on communication
    - €1.1 bn on security
    - €0.7 bn on other infrastructure

### Public Investment to GDP Ratio 2006-2010 (Period Average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>5.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
Prospects – Structural Deficits

- Pension system in Greece
  a. Pension expenditures = 11.5% of GDP
    - Highest in the OCED (average 7.2%)  
  b. Rapid ageing
    - 29.1% aged over 65 (vs 23.6% in OECD)  
  c. Poor incentives design
    - Contribution period for full pension: 35 years
      - 40 years (Canada, France); 44 years (Japan)
    - Reference period for benefits: last 5 years
      - Canada (best 34 years)
      - France (best 25 years)
      - Japan (whole career)

Prospects – Structural Deficits

1. Low tax-to-GDP ratio (32%)
2. Major sources of government revenues: VAT & social security contribution
   - As the economy worsens and unemployment mounts, revenues declines

3. Low tax collection efficiency

Prospects – Structural Deficits

4. Tax evasion
   - Large size of informal economy

Figure 2.2. The size of shadow economy: An international comparison
   In per cent of GDP

Prospects – Economic Health

1. Economic structure
   - Public sector: 40% of GDP
     - Provision of public goods: 23% of GDP (2009)
   - Tourism: 15% of GDP
     - Sensitive to external demand
   - R&D expenditures: 0.59% of GDP (2007)
     - Low growth potential
   - Ability to repay: doubtful

Prospects – Economic Health

2. Labor market
   - Unemployment rate
     - 23.1% (May, 2012); 12.6% (2010); 9.5% (2009)
   - Long term unemployment
     - 45% (2010); 40.8% (2009)
   - Youth (15-24) unemployment rate
     - 25.3% (2009 Q3)
   - Youths 15-19 not in education nor employment
     - 18.2% (2010)
   - Youths 20-24 not in education nor employment
     - 7.9% (2010)

Confidence

- Diminished confidence & reinforced fear
  - One day before Greece’s request, Eurostat, the EU’s statistical authority, reported that Greece’s 2009 deficit is equal to 13.6% of its GDP, a figure higher than what Greece claimed (12.7%)
  - Rating agency Moody’s downgraded Greece’s rating to A3 and citing it “significant risk”; Standard and Poor’s downgraded Greece's credit rating to junk status

Confidence

- Greece Government Bond Yield (10 Years)

The Case of Spain
Overview

- A different crisis in Spain
  - Burst of housing bubbles following the global financial crisis
  - The burst of bubble hurts the households, affects consumption and investment
The bubbles also hurts the banking sector and affects business

- After the clash, banks became the owners of the newly built houses
- But the worth of those houses decreased following the crisis
- Banks can’t meet the capital requirement, hence stringent credits to business

Source: The Economist (3 Feb 2011) Roll up, roll up.
Trigger

- Single currency
  - Low borrowing costs for all
  - Over-investment

Trigger

Real residential property prices in selected euro area countries

Note: Quarterly; 1998Q1=100.

Prospects – Fiscal Health

- Fiscal health now deteriorates
  - Government bailouts to and nationalization of banks would increase sovereign debts
  - *Cajas* (savings banks that accounted for 50% market share in credits and in deposits in Spain), in 2011 received €15 billion injection from the government. An extra €20 billion would be required according to some estimates
  - *Bankia*, the third largest bank of Spain, was nationalized by the government in May 2012
  - Later, additional €19 billion was pumped into the bank

Sources:
2. The Economist (3 Feb 2011) Roll up, roll up.
Prospects – Banking System

- Bank bailed-out or nationalised by the central government, another debt crisis?
  - Structural problems similar to Greece’s
    - Unemployment (21.7% in 2011)
    - Pension system, large informal economy
    - But better on the revenue side

Sources:
Prospects – Banking System

- Bank bailed-out or nationalised by the central government, another debt crisis?

- On top of that
  - Economy of larger size
  - Spain owes large amounts to Germany (€132 bn) and France (€112 bn)

Sources:
Another sovereign debt crisis?

Spain Government Bond Yield (10 Years)

What’s Next?

- Liquidity problem resolved?
  - A regional debt problem (cf. China)?
    - Devil in the details: government expenditures are highly decentralised

Like Greece, high debt level in the US
Real Estate Bubbles

- Like Spain, housing bubbles in the US

**Source:** Standard and Poor’s (June 2012) S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices
Europe and US Compared

- Similar problems
  - High public debt
  - Housing bubbles
  - Hit by 2007 financial crisis
- Two questions
  - Does the US manage the crisis better?
  - Why no sovereign debt crisis in the US?
Any Differences?

- Asking the right question?
  - Situations is more asymmetric in the euro area (Germany, the Netherlands vs Greece, Spain).
  - A public-private sector crisis in the euro area versus a private sector “crisis” in the US.
  - Crisis situation started earlier (but deeper) in the US.

Any Differences?

- When making a comparison based on growth performance, US used to perform better
  - Eurosclerosis

- Technically, 2 blows in Europe (1 in the US)
  - No sovereign debt crisis in the US as it didn’t say “help”.

![Real GDP Growth Rates](chart.png)

Note: Estimates Start After 2010
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database: April 2012
Why the Differences?

Why the differences?

1. Different nature, different policy responses
2. Institutional constraints
   a. Problem of the many
   b. No-bailout clause and different monetary tools
   c. Mandate of the ECB and the first response to crisis
Different financial crises?

- Financial crisis impedes the way how **non-financial corporations** and **households** access to external financing.
- Financial system in the euro area is more “bank-based” (i.e. **firms** more dependent to banks to get financing.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of GDP (2007 observation)</th>
<th>Euro Area</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How the private sector financed?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank-financing</td>
<td>Bank loans</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market-financing</td>
<td>Bond market</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stock market</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Policy Responses

- ECB: A bolder central bank?
  - Target
  - Scale
  - Timing

Responses – Target & Scale

- Target and Scale
  - US: all market participants
  - Euro area: mainly banks (through OMOs)

# Responses – Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Euro Area</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP (2007)</strong></td>
<td>€ 8,372 billion ($11,477 billion)</td>
<td>$ 13,206 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The size of capital markets related to the private sector (2007)</strong></td>
<td>311% of GDP $ 35,693 billion</td>
<td>375% of GDP $ 49,522 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central bank balance sheet (total assets)</strong></td>
<td>€ 1,253 (Aug 07) € 3,080 (Jul 12)</td>
<td>$ 869 billion (Aug 07) $ 2,849 billion (Jul 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Difference</strong></td>
<td>€ 1,827 billion ($ 2,505 billion)</td>
<td>$1,980 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scale wrt. market size</strong></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expansion (2007 / 2012)</strong></td>
<td>146%</td>
<td>228%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
Institutional Constraint #1

- Problem of the many
  - Same bed, different dreams
    - 27 EU member states, not all eurozone members
    - Among 17 eurozone member states, there are Greece, Germany, Luxemburg, Cyprus, Estonia, Slovakia, Finland …
    - Different governments accountable to disjoint sets of citizens (i.e. different national interests)
    - There is only one objective function in the case of the US
  - Moral hazard
    - When there is more than one player
    - Should US save US this time? (Though time consistency problem)
    - Should Germany save Greece this time? (Moral hazard + (two) time consistency problems)
Institutional Constraint #2

- ECB can’t bailout the member state governments, …
  - EU (Article 125(1) of the Treaty)
    - “The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments… A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments … of another Member State.”
  - ECB (Article 123 of the Treaty)
    - “Overdrafts or any other type of credit facility with the ECB or with the national central banks in favour of … central governments … shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the ECB or national central banks of debt instruments.”
Institutional Constraint #2

- ... but it is part of the monetary policy in the States
- Fed may suppress bond yield through the open market operations. ECB has no such option

Institutional Constraint #3

- Different first response to the crisis
  - US: policy interest rates adjusted downward
  - Europe: policy interest rates adjusted upward or unchanged. Only adjusted downward in the Spanish crisis
Institutional Constraint #3

- Historical Changes of the Target Federal funds rate (Jan 07 – Jul 12)
  - Housing bubble: Sep 07
  - Lehman Bro: 15 Sep 08

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Level (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 Sep 07</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>4.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct 07</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Dec 07</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Jan 08</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jan 08</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Mar 08</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Apr 08</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Oct 08</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Oct 08</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Dec 08</td>
<td>-1.00 to -0.75</td>
<td>0.00 – 0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Institutional Constraint #3

- **Key interest rates: MRO rates**
  - Fixed rate for fixed rate tenders
  - Minimum bid rate for variable rate tenders

- **Historical change of MRO rates**
  - GR: 23 Apr 10
  - ES: 11 Jul 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Fixed</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 Mar 07</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Jun 07</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stock market clash Sep 07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jul 08</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Oct 08</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>Fixed rate down from 4.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Nov 08</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Dec 08</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jan 09</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Mar 09</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Apr 09</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 May 09</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Apr 11</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Jul 11</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Nov 11</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Dec 11</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Jul 12</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Institutional Constraint #3

- Why the “strategy”?  
- Different mandates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ECB</th>
<th>Federal Reserve</th>
<th>Bank of Japan</th>
<th>Bank of England</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mandate</td>
<td>Price stability</td>
<td>Price stability</td>
<td>Price stability</td>
<td>Price stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Growth</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Financial stability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bad Neighbours

- Systemic Risk
  - Domino effect
  - Inter- and Intra-country

![Diagram of credit and bail out relationships between banks and governments in different countries.]

- Country 1
  - Bank A
  - Bank B
  - Government 1
  - Credit
  - Bail out
  - Common market
  - Sovereign bond

- Country 2
  - Bank A
  - Bank J
  - Government 2
  - Credit
  - Bail out
  - Sovereign bond

- Country 3
  - Bank X
  - Bank Y
  - Government 3
  - Credit
  - Sovereign bond
Bad Neighbours

- Intra-regional trade plays a significant role in the EU
  - The exit of exports-led recovery is blocked

# Bad Neighbours

## Bilateral Trade Balance of Selected European Countries (% of GDP of the Home Country)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>-0.426</td>
<td>0.641</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.631</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-1.092</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.206</td>
<td>-0.160</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>-0.895</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>-0.151</td>
<td>-1.015</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-4.683</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>6.801</td>
<td>2.363</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>1.868</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>1.433</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-1.025</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>-0.195</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>-1.942</td>
<td>-1.012</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.177</td>
<td>-1.915</td>
<td>-0.565</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-1.701</td>
<td>-0.543</td>
<td>0.849</td>
<td>-0.255</td>
<td>-0.558</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Period average (2000 – 2007), except for Germany (2000 – 2006); trade deficit in red.

Attempts
Do the policies work?
Upcoming
Attempts – Overview

- Start of the debt crisis: May 2010
- Local level
  - Fiscal consolidation
- The EU
  - Greek Loan Facility (May 2010)
  - EFSM (Jan 2011)
  - EFSF (May 2010)
  - ESM, to succeed EFSF and EFSM (expected in force July 2013)
  - Fiscal Compact (Treaty signed in 2012; expected in force Jan 2013)
- The ECB
  - “Special” LTRO (May 2010; June 2010; Dec 2011; Feb 2012)
  - OMT (Sept 2012)
General Strategy

- Debt Problem (Greece)
  - EU level solution

- Liquidity Problem (Spain, may become a debt problem)
  - ECB level solution
  - Mandate of ECB disallows ECB to bailout government
  - Politically difficult to use taxpayers’ money to bailout private enterprises

- Key is to quench the cycle by sending market a positive signal
  - Short-term measures
    - Ease liquidity
  - Long-term measures (i.e. new commitment devices)
    - Contain debt (e.g. austerity measures, Fiscal Compact)
    - Improve economic health (e.g. Euro Plus Pact – a series of economic reforms in pension systems, labor market, product market to enhance competitiveness of the EU. Won’t be discussed here)
Attempts by Local Government

- Fiscal consolidation to put deficit under control
  - In Greece
    - Salary freeze of public employees
    - Public employee bonus and allowance cut
    - Trimming administration structure
    - Cutting minimum wage
    - Spending cut in health and defence
    - Pension reform (e.g. rise in retirement age, pension cuts)
    - Rise in VAT (and other taxes)
    - Privatization of the gas companies
  - Also, to reduce tax evasion
    - Informal economy in Greece: about 25% of GDP in 2011 (Schneider 2011)
    - Tax evasion: €41 billion in Greece (Artavanis et al. 2012)
  - Controversial
    - Massive strikes
    - Austerity is a form of contractionary fiscal policy

European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)

- **Background**
  - created by the euro area member states
  - EFSF is a Luxembourg-registered company owned by the euro area member states
  - Rating: Aaa (Moody’s); AA+ (Standard & Poor’s)
  - With a tenure of 3 years

- **Objective**
  - to safeguard financial stability in Europe by providing financial assistance to euro area member states

- **Instruments**
  - Provide loans to country in financial difficulties
  - Intervene in the debt markets in the time of exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability
  - Finance recapitalisations of financial institutions through loans to governments

- **Scale**
  - €780 billion from the euro area member states, lending capacity of €440 billion

- **Beneficiary (as at 17 July 2012)**
  - Ireland: €17.7 billion
  - Portugal: €26 billion
  - Greece: €179.6 billion

European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM)

- **Background**
  - created by the EU member states
  - European Commission is allowed to borrow up to a total of €60 billion in financial markets on behalf of the EU to the beneficiary member state. The EU budget guarantees the repayment of the bonds.
  - Rating: EU enjoys an AAA credit rating from major rating agencies

- **Objective**
  - provides financial assistance to EU Member States in financial difficulties.

- **Instruments**
  - Provide loans or credit to country in financial difficulties
  - Request by the member state has to include (i) an assessment of financial needs and (ii) an economic and financial adjustment programme describing the various measures to be taken to restore financial stability

- **Scale**
  - €60 billion
  - The cap (by far) for Ireland is €22.5 billion; for Portugal is €26 billion.

- **Beneficiary (as at 3 July 2012)**
  - Ireland (totaling to €20.7 billion over 1.5 year)
  - Portugal (totaling to €20.1 billion over 1 year)

European Stability Mechanism (ESM)

- **Background**
  - It is an amendment of the “no bailout to government” clause in the ECB mandate (Article 125)
  - ESM Treaty was signed in 2 Feb 2012, yet to be ratified by individual euro area member states
  - A permanent fund to succeed EFSF and EFSM, starting from 1 July 2013 (expected)
  - ESM will be an intergovernmental organisation. It could invest in financial market, borrow on the capital markets from banks, financial institutions or other institutions. (Article 21 and 22)

- **Objective**
  - To safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States

- **Instruments**
  - Loan to ESM member, purchase of bond of an ESM member from the primary and secondary market
  - Support from ESM is subjected to strict conditionality (incl. macro-economic adjustment programme)

- **Scale**
  - Capital: €700 billion from euro area member states
  - Lending Capacity: €500 billion (subjected to revision)

- **Eligibility (request for assistance)**
  - ESM Member (i.e. governments of the euro area member states)

- **Beneficiary**
  - “The Board of Governors may decide to grant financial assistance through loans to an ESM Member for the specific purpose of re-capitalising the financial institutions of that ESM Member.” (Article 15(1))

Sources:
Fiscal Compact

- Treaty signed on 2 Mar 2012 but subjected to be ratified by individual member state (expected in force Jan 2013)
- Apply to countries using euro (now and in the future)
- Contents
  - Government deficit does not exceed 0.5% of nominal GDP (vs previously 3%)
  - Debt to nominal GDP ratio below 60% (re-stated)
    - Over half of the member states have breached the term with no serious consequences
  - Automatic correction mechanism for deviated countries. That includes a budgetary and structural adjustment program assessed and monitored by the Council and the Commission, and a fine below 0.1% of GDP payable to ESM

Attempts by the ECB

- Aim at the liquidity problem - Longer Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs)

- Aim at the sovereign debt problem – Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs)
Longer Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs)

- Repo auctions
  - Provide liquidity to the banking sector to fulfill capital requirements
- Long been a monetary policy instrument in euro area
  - Weekly auction (MROs)
    - Maturity – 1 or 2 week(s)
  - Monthly auction (LTROs)
    - Maturity – 3 months
    - Accounted for 20% of overall liquidity by ECB in 2003
- During the crisis
  - LTRO with 6-month and 36-month maturity (vs 3-month)
    - Announced 10 May 2010 - 1 round: May 2010 (6-month maturity)
    - Announced 8 Dec 2011 - 2 rounds: Dec 2011 & Feb 2012 (36-month maturity)
  - Fixed rate tender with full allotment (vs. variable rate or fixed rate without full allotment)

Sources:
2. ECB (10 May 2010) ECB decides on measures to address severe tensions in financial markets. Press Release
3. ECB (8 Dec 2011) ECB announces measures to support bank lending and money market activity. Press Release
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs)

- Transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets that aim at safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy.
- A necessary condition for Outright Monetary Transactions is strict and effective conditionality attached to an appropriate European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme.
- Transactions will be focused on the shorter part of the yield curve, and in particular on sovereign bonds with a maturity of between one and three years.
- No ex ante quantitative limits are set on the size of Outright Monetary Transactions.
- The liquidity created through Outright Monetary Transactions will be fully sterilised.

Sources:
1. ECB Press Release: Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions
Do the policies work?
Debt Level and Rescue Packages Compared

- Overall debt level in the banking sector is still high relative to the package.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As at</td>
<td>2012 Q1</td>
<td>2011 Q4</td>
<td>2012 Q1</td>
<td>2012 Q1</td>
<td>2012 Q1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gross External Debt</strong></td>
<td>429</td>
<td>1804</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Of which</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks (Total)</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks (Short-term)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SMP (Eurozone wide)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CBPP (Eurozone wide)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LTRO (Eurozone wide)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Add-on for ESM

- Proposed in the Euro Area Summit in June 2012
  - ESM may recapitalise banks directly
  - This is not possible under current EU law as the ECB would need to take additional role on euro-zone wide bank supervision

- Implications
  - Banks rescued
  - Impact on public debt would be released

- Progress
  - Expected end of 2012 or early 2013

Reuters (29 Jun 2012) Spain to switch to direct bank recapitalization when ESM has that capability-official.
Euro Exit?

- Currently no legal mechanism to leave the euro area, though legally a country could leave the EU according to the Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.
- To exit euro zone, Greece has to leave the EU first. That involves negotiation of terms agreed by the majority of the EU member states.

- Costs of Greece leaving the euro
  - Economic disaster and chaos for the “new” economy with the “new” currency (e.g. redenomination of assets, devaluation, capital flight, inflation, etc.)
  - Political cost: future relationship with the EU

- Costs of Germany leaving the euro
  - Lost of its advantages in international trade

- Costs of EU kicking Greece out
  - Outside the euro zone: investor’s confidence to euro and peripheral countries (who’s the next?)
  - Inside the euro zone: capital flight, bank run

Sources:
Policy Dilemma

Sovereign

Banking

Debt Crisis

Growth

Crisis

Crisis
Convergence Criteria

- Convergence Criteria in the EU Treaty
  - Economic and legal preconditions necessary for the adoption of the euro
  - Economic convergence
    - Price developments
    - Fiscal developments
    - Exchange rate developments
    - Long term interest rate developments
  - Legal convergence
    - Independence of the national central bank (NCB)
    - Legal integration of the NCB into the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)

Economic Convergence

- Price developments
  - Average rate of inflation does not exceed by more than 1.5 percentage points that of the three best performing member states in terms of price stability

- Fiscal developments
  - The ratio of government deficit to GDP must not exceed 3%
  - The ratio of government debt to GDP must not exceed 60%
Economic Convergence

- Exchange rate developments
  - Respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) for at least the last two years before the examination without devaluing against the euro

- Long-term interest rate developments
  - An average nominal long-term interest rate (of long-term government bonds) does not exceed by more than 2 percentage points that of the three best performing member states in terms of price stability
Legal Convergence

- ECB has 2 core units
  - Governing Council (similar to the FOMC in the Fed)
    - Governors from NCBs in euro area
  - General Council (can’t vote on monetary policy)
    - Governors from other NCBs in EU
    - Eliminated when all member states adopt euro
- Executive Board is part of the Governing Council
- Eurosystem = ECB + NCBs in euro area
- ESCB = Eurosystem + Other NCBs in EU
# Monetary Policy Tools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standing Facilities</th>
<th>ECB</th>
<th>Fed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Loan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Marginal lending facility</td>
<td>Discount window</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Overnight</td>
<td>Overnight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference interest rate</td>
<td>MRO rate</td>
<td>Fed funds rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of the Interest rate</td>
<td>Marginal lending rate</td>
<td>Discount rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>100 basis points above the reference rate</td>
<td>25 to 50 basis points below the reference rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deposit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Deposit facility</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>Overnight facility at rate 100 basis points below the reference rate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# Monetary Policy Tools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reserve Requirements</th>
<th>ECB</th>
<th>Fed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserve ratio</td>
<td>Ratio 0 to 2 per cent</td>
<td>0 to 10 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of account</td>
<td>Checking accounts and some other short-term deposits</td>
<td>Accounts with unlimited checking privileges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposit balances of …</td>
<td>One-month average</td>
<td>Two-week average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remuneration</td>
<td>Average of the refinancing rate over the period</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>